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constitute one of the many matters to be considered by the court In
determining whether the amount which is to be paid in the future
should be changed.
In a few jurisdictions the courts have held that installments of
alimony which are past-due and payable are not assignable.Y In these
jurisdictions "a wife's claim for alimony is considered as a purely personal right, and not in any sense a property right-a right in its nature
not susceptible of either assignment or enjoyment by her in anticipation",- and "the court has full control of the subject of alimony after a
decree awarding it, and the parties are not at liberty to contract away
the right of the court in the exercise of its statutory perogative to control and regulate the payment of alimony after judgment of divorce".1
Under these decisions, the wife does not have a vested interest in the
alimony until it is paid over to her and since the alimony that should
be awarded in such cases is a matter which concerns the parties, the
children, and in some degree, the public, these interests would be
placed in constant jeopardy if the wife could, at her pleasure, assign
such decree. It is true in all jurisdictions that the husband can go
into court and upon showing that the amount which he is paying is in
excess of the amount necessary to satisfy the wife's needs, or that the
financial position of the husband has been changed or altered so that
the amount which he is paying is unjust and unreasonable, have the
future installments modified; therefore it seems that this would provide sufficient supervision by the court to protect the interests of
the parties and especially those of the husband.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the courts have reached the
proper result in decreeing that future installments of alimony are nonassignable; the better rule relating to the lump sum award or settlement
would be to permit the wife to make an assignment thereof if she so
desired, and the majority rule, holding that past-due installments can
be assigned, should be followed in all jurisdictions.
. RAmoN A. WooDALL, Ja.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF INSURANCE IN KENTUCKY
Regulation of business by governmental agencies is an accepted
fact in the United States today. Administrative boards, both state and
federal, are at present engaged in the regulation of all sorts and types
of business enterprise. It has long ceased to be a question of whether
there is a right to exercise this form of control; it is rather, how far
may the government go in its regulation, and what form may this
regulation take? There are several factors which have given rise to
this new type of control, namely, the lack of time and technique of
'°Greenburg v. Greenburg, 99 N. J. Eq. 461, 133 Atl. 768 (1926);
Fournier v. Clutton, 146 Mich. 298, 109 N. W. 425 (1906); Welles v.
Brown, 226 Mich. 657, 198 N. W. 180 (1924); Duss v. Duss, 92 Fla. 1081,
111 So. 382 (1926).
Supra, n. 20.
22Supra, n. 20.

STUDENT NOTES

legislative bodies; the necessity for expert knowledge, which can be
better obtained by administrative bodies; and the great increase in the
number of services afforded the people by the government; which have
rendered it impracticable, if not impossible, for the legislatures and
the courts to properly handle them.
One of the types of private enterprise subject to administrative
regulation in Kentucky is the business of insurance. This form of
control over insurance was first exercised in Kentucky in 1893, when
the Insurance Department, headed by a Commissioner, was created.2
As then established it was a branch of the auditing department of the
state, with only partial control over insurance matters. Since that
time it has undergone a series of changes until, in 1936, it assumed its
present form. At that time the Division of Insurance, headed by a
Director,3 was established as a part of the Department of Business
Regulation and given complete control of insurance matters. 4 Certain
phases of this control are herein considered.
THE ISSUANCE AND REVOCATION OF LICENSES
1.

Licux s To Do BusINEss.

Every company must obtain a certificate from the Director before
it can do business in the state.5 The obtaining of this certificate is not
a mere procedure of application and issuance, as a matter of right.
The Director must be satisfied "by such examination and evidence as
he sees fit to make and require" that the company is otherwise duly
qualified under the laws of Kentucky to do business, and that it has
the required amount of capital or premiums invested in the proper
manner.0
His control over the organization and investment of the
company does not cease here. He is empowered to call for a detailed
yearly statement from the company as to its condition; 7 he is required
to visit each domestic company at least once every four years and
thoroughly inspect and examine its affairs; 8 and he may examine a
domestic company when he deems it prudent, br upon the complaint
I "Such means of control attain a degree of efficiency in administration, generality of treatment and at th same time an individualism of
the application of rules, unobtainable through inflexible legislative
directions."
Becker, The Administrative Control of Insurance in
Wiscons in, 4 Wis. L. R. 129.
2Ky. Statutes (Carroll 1936 ed.) see. 774. All statutory references
throughout this note are to Carroll's 1936 edition.
"The terms Commissioner and Director will be used interchangeably in this note.
I Ky. Statutes, sec. 4618-119: "The division of insurance headed by
a director, under the supervision of the Commissioner of Business
Regulation, shall have and exercise all functions vested in the Department of Insurance under .. ., and elsewhere in the statutes."
Ky. Statutes, secs. 621, 634.
Ky. Statutes, secs. 621, 624, 752.
7 Ky. Statutes, secs. 651, 666, 691.
Ky. Statutes, sec. 752.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
of five or more interested parties, and a foreign company "whenever
he deems it prudent for the protection of the policy holders of this
Commonwealth."' For the purpose of such examination, the Director
is given free access to all books and papers of the company, or its
agents, And power to compel attendance of directors, officers, agents
"
If, after such examination,
and other interested parties as witnesses.
the Director "is of the opinion" that the company is in an unsound
condition, or has failed to comply with the laws of the state, he may
revoke the license of that company."
The authority of the Director to make these examinations before
issuing or revoking licenses has been upheld under the police power of
the state." He cannot, however, exercise the powers granted him arbitrarily or capriciously." He is bound strictly by the statutes and his
action can be enjoined when he acts outside his statutory authority, or
when he uses that authority arbitrarily.
From the very nature of his tasks it is necessary that the Director
have, and he is clothed by the statutes with, considerable discretion.
This discretion, however, is not without limits. It has been pointed
out above that he cannot act arbitrarily, or without statutory authority,
9Ibid.
10Ibid.
" Bell, Insurance Commissioner of Kentucky, v. Louisville Board of
Underwriters, 146 Ky. 841, 143 S. W. 388 (1912). The court construed
Ky. Statutes, see. 752, as giving the Commissioner the power to examine
a company, without complaint, in the following situations:
(a) if he
believes it is violating the law, (b) if he believes it to be in unsound
condition, (c) whenever he deems it prudent for the protection of the
policy holders. This decision, however, is not to be construed as affecting the power of the Commissioner to examine a domestic company
once every four years, as required by statute, or to examine any company upon complaint of five interested parties.
It is to be noted that the examining power was upheld in this case
although it was being used to discover whether or not the defendant
board was setting exhorbitant rates, a matter over which the Insurance
Commissioner had no control in 1912. See Ky. Statutes, see. 4618-37,
which transferred this power from the Auditor to the Commissioner.
nKy. Statutes, see. 753. It is to be noted that the statute, as it
concerns foreign companies, reads "upon examination, or other evidence." (Italics ours.)
" In Mutual Life Insurance Co. of N. Y. v. Prewitt, Insurance Commissioner, 127 Ky. 399, 105 S. W. 463 (1907), the Commissioner contended that his action was final and could not be reviewed. The court
said: "The Insurance Commissioner is a creature of the statute. He
has no authority except that which the statute confers upon him. In the
state of case in which the statute authorizes him to revoke a license, his
discretion, unless exercised arbitrarily, cannot be controlled by injunction; but where he undertakes to act in a state of case in which the
statute gives him no authority to act, he may be controlled by injunction ...
It is the province of the courts to construe the statute, and
determine the scope of his authority."
Although revocation of a license is the subject of this case, it is
authority for limitation upon all powers of the Commissioner.

STUDLNT NOTES

but it is only from looking at the decisions that the actual bounds of
his discretion may be ascertained.
14
In National Benefit Association v. Clay, Insurance Commissioner,
the
the company, a foreign corporation, sued for a mandamus to compel
Commissioner to issue it a certificate to do business. No reason was
assigned by the Commissioner for refusing the certificate, but it appeared from his brief that he was of the opinion that "its charter does
not conform to the laws of this State, and the provisions of its charter
are inconsistent with the laws of this State." The court showed some
disposition to rely upon the decision of the Commissioner, but, as no
reasons for his determination appeared, it was forced to look to the
statutes and determine the matter for itself. It ordered the mandamus
to issue, saying that the company had complied with all of the statutory
requirements, that it was in a sound condition, there was nothing in
its charter or by-laws or method of doing business which was obnoxious
to the laws of Kentucky, and, therefore, the Commissioner must issue
the certificate.
The Commissioner was also overruled in Mutual Life Insurance
5
Company of N. Y. v. Prewitt, Insurance Commissioner. He had revoked
the company's license because it had discharged its state manager by
reason of his candidacy for trustee on a ticket in opposition to that
supported by the trustees in office, and had used part of its funds in
soliciting support for the candidates of the trustees in office, the amount
spent not affecting its solvency. The Commissioner's only contention
was that by this conduct the company had "failed to comply with the
law", and he was, therefore, authorized to revoke its license. The
court said that the statuteO authorizing the Commissioner to revoke
a license where a company had "failed to comply with the law" did
not authorize a revocation unless the company had violated some
statute regulating insurance companies, and as no such violation was
disclosed by the record the license should be reinstated. Here again
the Commissioner failed to give the reasons for his opinion, and the
court was obliged to decide the question merely from the statutes and
the evidence before it.
The Commissioner refused to issue a license to write automobile
insurance in Allin, Insurance Commissioner, v. American Indemnity
Comipany," because the company, a foregin corporation, was authorized
by its charter to write both automobile and fire insurance, which practice was prohibited by a Kentucky statute.5 The court overruled the
14162 Ky. 409, 172 S. W. 922 (1915). The court further held that
the fact that the charter of a foreign corporation gave it more
powers than those allowed a similar domestic corporation is not a
violation of the Kentucky Constitution, sec. 202, which forbids foreign
corporations to engage in business in Kentucky under more favorable
conditions than domestic corporations.
'5127 Ky. 399, 105 S. W. 463 (1907).
1 Ky. Statutes, sec. 753.
"246 Ky. 396, 55 S. W. (2d) 44 (1932).
11Ky. Statutes, sec. 6S7.
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Commissioner's contention that this amounted to a non-compliance with
the laws of the state, and said that the statute in question did not
apply when the license sought was for the purpose of writing only one
form of insurance.
From these decisions it is possible to obtain a view of the judicial
control of the Commissioner's discretion is the issuing and revoking
of licenses to do business. They seem to show, not only that he is held
strictly to the statutes, but also that his discretion in their application
is subject to close scrutiny by the courts.

2.

LICEmsING or AGENTS.

By the statutes,' the Commissioner is empowered to issue, suspend
and revoke agent's licenses. It was settled in 1905, in Commonwealth v.
Gregory,2"that no license is required for agents of domestic companies.
Discussion on this point, therefore, will concern only the agents of
foreign companies.
There are separate statutes controlling life insurance agents, but
the form and procedure required in the regulation of all agents is substantially the same.' Before a license is issued, the applicant must fill
out certain forms and provide such information concerning himself, as
2
Then, upon being reasonably satisthe Commissioner shall require.
fied that the applicant is a trustworthy and properly qualified person,
the Commissioner is required to issue the license. Should he refuse,
the applicant may appeal from his decision to the Franklin Circuit
Court, with further appeal, if desired, "as in other civil cases." As an
incident to examination of the applicants, the Commissioner has been
given discretion to prescribe the questions contained in the forms, and
to alter the contents of the forms from time to time as he sees fit.M
The grounds upon which the Commissioner may suspend and revoke
2
an agent's license are enumerated in the statutes, which also prescribe
the proceedure to be followed. Written notice must be given to the
agent and his company, and full opportunity for a hearing afforded.
The form of appeal is the same as that provided in the cases of refusal
to grant a license.
All of the cases found dealing with granting and revoking of agent's
"Ky. Statutes, secs. 634, 659-1, 659-2, 659-6, 694, 762a-14b, 762a-14d,
762a-14e.
121 Ky. 256, 89 S. W. 168 (1905). It was held that, as the statutes
of the State could be construed not to require a license for agents of
domestic companies, and as no license had been required for them by
the officers of the State since the passage of the said statutes, no license
was required.
=Ibid.
22 Ky. Statutes, secs. 659-2, 762a-14b.
= Ky. Statutes, see. 762a-14c. For a recent case upholding a similar
delegation of power to an administrative official, see U. S. v. Tish man,
99 F. (2d) 951 (1931).
"Ky. Statutes, secs. 659-6, 762a-14d.

STUDENT NoTEs
licenses have as their main issue the question of rebating.n In Lyman
v. Razey, Insurance Commissioner,26 the applicant was secretary and
only employee of an unincorporated, non-profit association. He sought
a license to write bonds and indemnity insurance for members of the
association, the commissions to be turned over to the association and
used to pay his salary and the expenses of his office. The Commissioner
refused to issue the license on the ground that this arrangement would
result in a rebate to the association members. The court upheld his
contention, saying that the applicant could have acted himself as agent,
but could not act as an agent and employee of the association at the
same time.
The question arose again in Rogers v. Ramey, Insurance Comm,2'sio2er.
The applicant, an employee of a corporation which was
authorized by its charter to "act as agent for persons and corporations
in any and all matters which can be solicited, negotiated, operated and
carried on by an agent or trustee," applied for a license to write insurance, the commissions to be turned over to the corporation. The Commissioner again refused to issue the license on the ground that the
arrangement would result in rebating. The court, however, overruled
the Commissioner and ordered the license to issue, saying that this
really amounted to the corporation being the agent, which it was
authorized to be by its charter.- The provision in the charter took
the case out of the rule in the Lyman case.
In Saufley, Insurance Commissioner, v. Smith, et al.,'Smith, a
part time employee of a banker's association, applied for a license to
maintain an agency just discontinued by the association as a result
of the decision in the Lyman case, and was refused by the Commissioner on the ground that the arrangement would result in rebating,
in that a sufficient number of the association members would patronize
Smith to justify his taking a small salary for his part time work for
the association. The court overruled the Commissioner, and ordered
the license to issue. It said that the possibility that members of the
association would patronize Smith was not sufficient reason to refuse
'Ky. Statutes, sec. 762a-19: "No insurance company nor any agent,
in connection with placing or attempting to place insurance, shall pay,
allow or give, or offer to pay, allow or give, nor shall any person
receive, any rebate of premium on a policy, or any special advantage in
dividends or other benefits, paid employment or contract for services,
or any valuable consideration or inducement whatever, not specified in
the policy, or give, sell or purchase, in connection with placing or
attempting to place insurance, anything whatsoever not specified in
the policy .. "
195 Ky. 223, 242 S. W. 21 (1922).
-1198 Ky. 138, 248 S. W. 254 (1923).
Cf. Saufley, Insurance Commissioner, v. Botts, et al., 209 Ky. 137, 272 S. W. 408 (1925).
The Commissioner further contended that the corporation could
not be an insurance agent, as the statute required him to be satisfied
that the applicant was a person of good moral character, and a corporation was not a person. The court held that this statutory requirement did not prevent a corporation from being an agent.
*209 Ky. 134, 272 S. W. 379 (1925).
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the license, and even should they give him their business it would not
amount to rebating.
The decisions seem to indicate that the court is unwilling to give
over to the Commissioner the application of the statutes in this matter.
The statutes give to the Commissioner discretion in granting, suspending and refusing licenses, but, upon the question of rebating at least,
it is the court's discretion, and not that of the Commissioner, which
prevails.
THE POLICY
There are no standard forms of insurance policies required in Kentucky.' The nearest approach to this form of control is found in the
statute3' which prescribes certain provisions that must be contained
"in substance" in all life insurance policies. There are several scattered statutes3 ' requiring minor provisions and certain other infomation
to be included in different ones of the various types of policies, but
substantial control over the form of the policy has not as yet been
undertaken in Kentucky.
CONCLUSION
Kentucky has not gone as far as some of the other states in administrative control of insurance.'
But as the Division of Insurance has
developed fom 1893 to the present, it has been given more and more
powers and duties, and there is nothing to indicate that this trend
will change.
The Director has been clothed with many powers and duties and
granted a certain amount of discretion in their exercise, but the
decisions as a whole seem to show that the courts have, and are, maintaining a strict control over his actions. Reed v. General Insurance
Company of America,' a recent case, would seem to be indicative of
the court's present attitude. In that case the Commissioner contended
that the form of the five year annual renewal option, used by the
defendant company in its policies, resulted in "unfair discrimination"
and "rebating." It differed from the installment-note form of option,
the form in general use, in that, instead of requiring five notes for the
premiums at the beginning of the five year period, the insured could
Standard policies are required in Massachusetts, Michigan, New
Hampshire, and New York, and other states. See Vance, Insurance,
(2nd ed.), pp. 41-44 (1930).
1Ky. Statutes, sec. 659.
12i. e., Ky. Statutes, sec. 676, which requires that the amount to be
paid on policies of Assessment and Cooperative Life Companies be
stated in the policy; Ky. Statutes, sec. 679, which requires the constitution and by-laws of the company and the application to be made
a part of the policies of Assessment and Cooperative Life Companies:
Ky. Statutes, sec. 706, which requires all Assessment and Cooperative
Fire Companies to attach a copy of their by-laws to each policy.
" See Becker, Administrative Control of Insurance in Wisconsin,
4 Wis. L. R. 129 (1927).
11265 Ky. 206, 96 S. W. (2d) 259 (1936).

STUDENT NOTES
wait until the beginning of each year to pay and still
of the reduced rates which were allowed for term
the insured would not have to bind himself for the
ums In any way at the beginning of the period.
Commissioner's contention, the court said:

obtain the benefits
insurance. Thus
subsequent premiIn overruling the

"The fundamental error of such views is the assumption that
the installment-note form of policies is the acme of term insurance,
and that any other plan embodies the essential elements of "unfair
discrimination", "rebating", and all other things inhibited by the
statutes."
The holding and the language of the court indicate a disposition
to substitute its judgment on the question of unfair practice for that of
the Commissioner, a man presumably selected for the very purpose of
observing, detecting and correcting insurance evils. It is probable
that the attitude of the Commissioner in trying, from time to time, to
force his determinations upon the court, and refusing to state his
reasons therefor, is largely responsible for this strict judicial supervision. What the attitude of the court would have been had the Commissioner readily presented detailed and reasoned findings is a matter
of conjecture. It has been suggested, however, that the degree of
judicial respect afforded administrative determinations depends upon
the readiness of administrative officials to fully state the reasons and
5
RioARD Busu, JR.
grounds upon which they proceed.

See Henderson, Federal Trade Commission, pp. 334-337

(1924).

